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AFTER FORTY YEARS OF ANTITRUST REVISION
AND APPLE INC. V. PEPPER, WHAT NOW
ILLINOIS BRICK?
JEFFREY L. HARRISON*
ABSTRACT
Nineteen seventy-seven was a paradigm-shifting year in antitrust law. Decisions by the Supreme Court greatly limited the type
of parties who could successfully bring antitrust actions and what
types of activities would violate the antitrust laws. First, in January
of that year, the Court, in Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, ruled
that to mount a case the plaintiff had to have suffered an antitrust
injury. In other words, even if the antitrust laws were violated, the
party raising the issue had to have suffered the type of harm the
laws were designed to avoid. Then in a fourteen day span the Court
decided Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania and Illinois Brick
Co. v. Illinois. In Sylvania, the Court held that vertical restraints
on distribution were to be assessed under the rule of reason as opposed to the per se standard. In so doing the Court adopted reasoning that would carry over to vertical restraints on prices and
applied in the context of some horizontal restraint cases. In Illinois
Brick, in a six to three decision, it held that indirect purchases could
not recover from price fixing firms even if the higher prices were
passed onto those purchasers by those purchasing directly from the
price fixers. Of these opinions, Illinois Brick has little, if any, continuing justification. This has been true for some time but now that
matter is more critical in the aftermath of the Supreme Court decision in Apple Inc. v. Pepper, which exposed after forty years, the
indeterminacy of Illinois Brick.
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INTRODUCTION
Nineteen seventy-seven was a paradigm-shifting year in
antitrust law. Decisions by the Supreme Court greatly limited the
type of parties who could successfully bring antitrust actions and
what types of activities would violate the antitrust laws. First, in
January of that year, the Court, in Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-OMat,1 ruled that to mount a case the plaintiff had to have suffered
an antitrust injury. In other words, even if the antitrust laws were
violated, the party raising the issue had to have suffered the type
of harm the laws were designed to avoid.2 Then in a fourteen day
span, the Court decided Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania3
and Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.4 In Sylvania, the Court held that
vertical restraints on distribution were to be assessed under the
rule of reason as opposed to the per se standard.5 In so doing, the
Court adopted reasoning that would carry over to vertical restraints
on prices6 and applied in the context of some horizontal restraint
cases.7 In Illinois Brick, in a six to three decision, it held that indirect purchasers could not recover from price fixing firms even if
the higher prices were passed onto those purchasers by those purchasing directly from the price fixers.8
Of these opinions, Illinois Brick has little, if any, continuing
justification. More precisely, it has become irrelevant in the process decreasing error rates in antitrust.9 This has been true for some
time, but now that matter is more critical in the aftermath of the

Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
Id.
3 Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 36 (1977).
4 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 720 (1977).
5 See Cont’l T. V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 57–59.
6 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 878,
882 (2007).
7 See, e.g., Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 189–90 (7th Cir.
1985); Gerlinger v. Amazon.com, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 838, 849 (N.D. Cal. 2004);
Rozema v. Marshfield Clinic, 977 F. Supp. 1362, 1378–79 (W.D. Wis. 1997).
8 See Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 720.
9 Errors can come in two forms. False positives mean condemning an activity
that is pro-competitive or harmless. False negatives mean no response to activities
that are actually harmful. Barry Barnett, Fear of False Positives Distorts Antitrust,
THE CONTINGENCY (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.thecontingency.com/2015/08
/fear-of-false-positives-distorts-antitrust/ [https://perma.cc/5Y6P-M9AR].
1
2
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Supreme Court decision in Apple Inc. v. Pepper10 which exposed,
after forty years, the indeterminacy of Illinois Brick. The two policies of Illinois Brick were to balance over and under deterrence of
the antitrust laws11 and to avoid “massive evidence and complicated
theories” in antitrust litigation.12 Antitrust law has changed dramatically in the forty years since Illinois Brick making these policies
achievable without the costs Illinois Brick imposes on downstream purchasers.13 Thus, like many things—cars, old computers,
dated editions of casebooks—Illinois Brick should be retired by
being overturned or modified.
The reasons are best understood after a closer examination
of Illinois Brick and where it fits in 2020 antitrust jurisprudence
but a brief listing of the reasons here is useful. First, as Apple Inc.
indicates, new marketing techniques have blurred the distinction
between direct and indirect purchasers.14 Indeed, today’s marketing
arrangements were likely unforeseeable by the Court in 1977.

139 S. Ct. 1514, 1522 (2019). Illinois Brick has received substantial attention
in the antitrust literature. See, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer, The Stealth Assault on
Antitrust Enforcement: Raising the Barriers for Antitrust Injury and Standing,
62 U. PITT. L. REV. 437, 443 (2001); Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reexamining the Role of Illinois Brick in Modern Antitrust Standing Analysis, 68 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1999); Edward D. Cavanagh, Illinois Brick: A Look Back and
a Look Ahead, 17 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 1 (2004); Andrew L. Gavil, Thinking
Outside the Illinois Brick Box: A Proposal for Reform, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 167, 167–
68 (2009); Andrew S. Gehring, The Power of the Purchaser: The Effect of Indirect Purchaser Damages Suits on Deterring Antitrust Violations, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 208, 208 (2010); Barak Richman & Christopher R. Murray, Rebuilding
Illinois Brick: A Functionalist Approach to the Indirect Purchaser Rule, 81 S. CAL.
L. REV. 69, 69 (2007); Maarten P. Schinkel, Jan Tuinstra & Jakob Rüggeberg,
Illinois Walls: How Barring Indirect Purchaser Suits Facilitates Collusion, 30
RAND J. ECON. 683, 683 (2008).
11 As will be discussed below, the Court also sought to balance the risk of
multiple liability against encouraging parties to act as private attorney generals.
Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 746.
12 Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1526. This rationale has always had a tail-waggingthe-dog character. Antitrust cases are complicated by nature but the Court’s
view seems to be that it is better to risk a false negative than to deal with a
complicated process that only relates to the remedy. See id.
13 See id. at 1525.
14 In Apple Inc., Apple sold iPhone applications that were designed by others. Apple allowed the developers to set the price of the applications and withheld
30 percent of the price charged for itself. Thus, while it was a direct seller, it did
not control the price except for requiring all prices to end in $0.99. Id. at 1519.
10
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More surprising, Apple Inc. reveals that after forty years of application the Court is split on what Illinois Brick stands for.15 To the
five Justice majority, Illinois Brick provides a bright-line test.16 To
the four Justice minority it is but an application of a proximate cause
analysis.17 Second, unlike 1977, now very few practices are per se
illegal and rule of reason cases very rarely make it to a stage at
which apportioning damages would be necessary.18 This also means
that to the extent Illinois Brick was based on the fear of multiple
liability and over-deterrence,19 that risk is now remote. Third, relatively new and higher standards for the introduction of expert
testimony,20 surviving summary judgment,21 and class certification22
also mean that many of the dangers outlined in Illinois Brick are
only theoretical. Fourth, antitrust standing and antitrust injury
analysis developed after Illinois Brick address all the policy concerns of that case, but can be viewed as allowing a more nuanced
approach to the question of which parties are eligible to bring an
antitrust action.23 Finally, there are strong arguments that Illinois
Brick was decided incorrectly at the time because it was premised
on a mistaken view of damages in price fixing cases.24
Before considering these factors and others, Part I takes a
close look at Illinois Brick and the cases in its aftermath that establish the indirect purchaser rule. An argument is made that Illinois

See infra text accompanying notes 146–88.
Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1524.
17 See infra text at accompanying notes 183–90.
18 For an empirical study, see Michael Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827 (2009) [hereinafter
Carrier, The Rule of Reason]; Michael Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging
the Disconnect, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1265 (1999) [hereinafter Carrier, Bridging
the Disconnect].
19 Over-deterrence creates the risk of false positive—results that condemn
practices that are harmless or pro-competitive. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act
at 13–14 (2008), https://www.justice.gov/atr/competition-and-monopoly-single
-firm-conduct-under-section-2-sherman-act [https://perma.cc/CHK6-NZ89].
20 See infra text accompanying notes 269–77.
21 See infra text accompanying notes 249–66.
22 See infra text accompanying notes 280–83.
23 See Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1522 (2019).
24 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LOST PROFITS
MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN PRICE ENHANCEMENT CASES 725 (West, 4th ed. 2011);
Jeffrey L. Harrison, The Lost Profits Measure of Damages in Price Enhancement
Cases, 64 MINN. L. REV. 751, 759–60 (1980).
15
16
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Brick was limited or even overturned in the Court’s principal
standing opinion, Associated General Contractors of California v.
California State Council of Carpenters25 and it was not until the
1990 decision in Kansas v. UtiliCorp Inc. that the indirect purchaser
rule became iron clad.26
The implication of this analysis is that until 1990, the parameters of Illinois Brick were vague. Now, after Apple Inc., the
status of Illinois Brick’s status is uncertain. In fact, both the majority and dissent in Apple Inc. make arguments that seem to undermine the holding in Illinois Brick.27 Part II is the heart of the
analysis. Each of the factors that support the notion that Illinois
Brick is no more than an antitrust nuisance are discussed. The
point made is that the antitrust world has shifted in the forty years
since Illinois Brick. Apple Inc. is the latest shift to make Illinois
Brick obsolete. In Conclusions and Recommendations, three proposals are offered. One is that Illinois Brick be revisited and overturned and replaced with a reasonably foreseeable standard. Another
is that indirect purchasers be permitted to collect from price fixing
firms when it is determined that direct purchasers seem unlikely
to take action. A final one is that whether plaintiffs are direct or indirect purchasers simply be one factor to be weighed in the analysis.
I.THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DIRECT PURCHASER
ELEMENT OF ANTITRUST STANDING
A.Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick
Illinois Brick is actually the second of two cases that raised
complementary issues. The first, Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., was decided nine years earlier.28 There a defendant was found to have violated section 2 of the Sherman Act by,
among other things, only renting as opposed to selling shoe-making
machinery to shoe manufacturers.29 The damages were calculated
as the difference between the amounts paid to rent the machinery

459 U.S. 519, 544–46 (1983). For a discussion of this possibility, see supra
text accompanying notes 10–24.
26 See Blair & Harrison, supra note 10, at 14, 16.
27 See infra text accompanying notes 174–89.
28 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 481 (1968).
29 Id. at 483.
25
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and the cost to buy the machinery had it been made available for
sale.30 The Court referred to this as an overcharge.31 Defendant,
United Shoe, argued that the damages awarded to the plaintiffs—
shoe manufacturers—should be reduced to the extent those plaintiffs
were able to pass on the damages to its own customers.32 The Court
rejected the “pass[-]on defense,” noting that it would be difficult
and perhaps only theoretically possible,33 to isolate the extent to
which the overcharge had been passed-on. In addition, the Court
was fearful that treble damage actions would lose much of their
effectiveness because dividing up the overcharge among the layers
in the chain of distribution would lower the incentives for direct purchasers to bring an action.34 In many respects, Hanover Shoe can
be seen as promoting the private the enforcement of antitrust law.
After a great deal of scholarly commentary35 Illinois Brick,
the corollary to Hanover Shoe, was decided in 1977. The Court
was composed of only four members who had served on the Hanover
Shoe Court and, as evidenced by Sylvania, the Court’s approach to
antitrust had undergone a change.36 Here the issue was whether

Id. at 483–84.
Id. at 490.
32 Id. at 481.
33 Id. at 493.
34 Id. at 494.
35 See, e.g., John Cirace, Price Fixing, Privity, and the Pass-On Problem in
Antitrust Treble-Damage Suits: A Suggested Solution, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV.
171, 171 (1977); Robert C. Harris & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 269, 270–
71 (1979); Robert Landes & Richard Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have
Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule
of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 602, 602 (1979); Robert Landes & Richard
Posner, The Economics of Passing On: A Reply to Harris and Sullivan, 128 U.
PA. L. REV. 1274, 1274 (1980); Bartlett McGuire, The Passing-On Defense and
the Right of Remote Purchasers to Recover Treble Damages under Hanover Shoe,
33 U. PITT. L. REV. 177, 177 (1971); Earl E. Pollock, Automatic Treble Damages
and the Passing-On Defense: The Hanover Shoe Decision, 13 ANTITRUST BULL.
1183, 1183 (1968); Elmer Schaefer, Passing-on Theory in Antitrust Treble
Damage Actions: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV.
883, 884 (1975); Comment, Standing to Sue in Antitrust Cases: The Offensive
Use of Passing-On, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 976, 979 (1975); see also Note, The Defense of “Passing On” in Treble Damages Suits Under the Antitrust Laws, 70
YALE L.J. 469, 472 (1961).
36 See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING
ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 223–27 (7th ed. 2019); supra text
accompanying note 3.
30
31
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overcharges passed-on to indirect purchasers could be recovered
by those indirect purchasers.37 This is the offensive use of the
pass-on rationale.38 The Court had three choices.39 It could have
overturned Hanover Shoe and declared that both offensive and
defensive use of the pass-on theory was permitted.40 It could have
left Hanover Shoe undisturbed and held that offensive use of the
pass-on theory was permissible while defensive use was not.41 Finally, it could have left Hanover Shoe intact and ruled that offensive
use of the theory was not permitted.42 In a six–three decision it chose
this last possibility.43
The Court’s analysis involved two steps.44 The first step was
deciding that plaintiffs and defendants were to be treated alike as
far as relying on the pass-on theory.45 It rejected the arguments of
the dissenters that parallel treatment was unnecessary.46 Allowing
offensive but not defensive use of the theory would, the Court reasoned, result in a “serious risk of multiple liability.”47 In addition,
allowing offensive but not defensive use would give rise to the same
tracing complexities addressed in Hanover Shoe,48 which stood for
the idea that the antitrust law would be more effectively enforced
by concentrating the incentive to bring an action in the hands of
direct purchasers.49
Having decided that plaintiffs and defendants should receive similar treatment, the Court rejected the use of pass-on
analysis for both parties.50 In dismissing this option, the Court
relied to some extent on the lack of legislative action in response to
its Hanover Shoe decision. 51 Mainly, though, the Court was concerned with the complex and massive process of tracing damages

Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 724 (1977).
Id. at 720.
39 See id.
40 See id.
41 See id. at 735.
42 See id. at 720–21.
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 See id. at 720.
46 Id. at 728.
47 Id. at 730.
48 Id. at 741–43.
49 Id. at 725–26.
50 Id. at 735.
51 Id. at 736.
37
38
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from manufacturer to distributor and so on.52 Ultimately, the Court
saw itself as choosing between antitrust damages designed to compensate plaintiffs or providing a deterrence to anticompetitive
practices.53 It reasoned that the compensation goal would dilute
the incentives for purchasers at any level to take on the task of acting as a private attorney general.54
The Court did leave open the possibility of two exceptions
in which indirect purchasers might recover. The first involves preexisting cost-plus contracts.55 If an indirect purchaser has a costplus contract with its supplier, then any price increase by that
supplier will be passed onto the indirect purchaser.56 The second
exception occurs when the direct seller is owned or controlled by
the indirect seller.57
Together, Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick advance the policies of avoiding complications on the assessments of damages while
concentrating incentives for private enforcement of the antitrust
laws in direct purchasers. A number of factors are noteworthy.
First, the opinion in Illinois Brick is rather cleverly constructed.
The Court viewed itself as having to choose between compensation
goals and deterrence goals. Yet this was a quandary of the Court’s
making. It could have achieved both goals by leaving Hanover Shoe
intact and allowing offensive use of pass-on theory. It was only
left to choose because, in the initial part of the opinion, it rejected
the dissenters’ arguments that this should be the outcome. Second, Illinois Brick, at some level, can be read to be very pro enforcement. As noted, the Court writes in terms of providing the
greatest incentive to direct purchasers.58 In actuality, the opinion
has become a tool for avoiding liability.59 Third, the Court conceded that some direct purchasers would be reluctant to bring actions against suppliers for fear of damaging their relationships.60
Still, without offering any compelling reasoning, the Court claimed

Id. at 744.
Id. at 745–46.
54 Id. at 746.
55 Id. at 736.
56 Id. at 736 n.16.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 735.
59 See Blair & Harrison, supra note 10, at 1.
60 Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 746.
52
53
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that the “private attorney general” theme of the antitrust laws was
better served by allowing only direct purchasers to sue.61
Fourth, the rationale for the two cases together is somewhat garbled. In Illinois Brick, in particular, the Court cautioned
against the risk of multiple liability, which suggests a possibility
of over-deterrence and false positives.62 On the other hand, it also
suggests that allowing offensive use of the pass through theory
would dilute private enforcement efforts and, by implication, create a risk of false negatives.63 By implication the Court seems to
believe there is some correct level of deterrence, but it did not articulate a standard for the balancing process in which it engaged.
In actuality, whatever notion that there is some optimal
level of antitrust enforcement behind the Court’s analysis was
completely undermined a few years later in California v. ARC
America Corp.,64 in which the Court upheld the rights of states to
enact legislation allowing for indirect purchaser action. In effect,
the risk of multiple liability became a function of geography as
opposed to any knowable antitrust policy.65 In short, whatever role
Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick were thought to play in balancing
false positives and false negatives has been rendered moot.
Finally, both decisions are premised on the idea that damages
in some cases are measured by the extent to which prices are above
the prices that would exist in the absence of a violation.66 Furthermore, the pass-on theory means dividing up this gross overcharge
among those in the chain of distribution.67 This is unnecessary if
damages are measured by the actual losses to firms which would be
manifested as lost profits. In fact, lost profits seem more in line


Id.
False positives are instances of labeling as anticompetitive practices that
are actually pro-competitive or, at least, harmless. Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert
Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 925,
963 (2010).
63 “False negative” refers to instances in which practices that are anticompetitive are not labeled as such. Lee Goldman, Trouble for the Private Enforcement
of the Sherman Act: Twombly, Pleading Standards, and the Oligopoly Problem,
2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1057, 1069 (2008).
64 490 U.S. 93 (1989); see Blair & Harrison, supra note 10, at 11–13.
65 It also should have ended discussions about optimal level of antitrust enforcement and sanctions since both federal and state antitrust regimes can exist
and have different substantive as well as remedial rules. Cirace, supra note 35,
at 174.
66 Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 725 n.3.
67 Id. at 726.
61
62
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with the statutory requirement that the injury be “in ... business or
property.”68 In fact, it is possible for an overcharged firm to suffer
only minor injury. Oddly, the Hanover Shoe Court actually notes the
availability of lost profits as a measure of damages in some cases69
but opts for overcharge in reliance on a case in which the overcharge
was to a municipality, which obviously could not have suffered a
decrease in profit.70
Still, Illinois Brick persists. Whether it and Hanover Shoe
have played any meaningful role in balancing over and under deterrence is doubtful.71 Similarly, the effort to simplify damages
calculations has a tail-wagging-the-dog character in that antitrust cases tend to be complicated and damages calculations are
often difficult. Nevertheless, courts have not otherwise eliminated entire classes of plaintiffs based on these difficulties.72 If all
other variables had remained the same as they were in 1977 perhaps Illinois Brick, in particular, was a sensible reaction.73 The
problem, as the following points out, is that very little in antitrust
remains as it was in 1977.74 In fact, subsequent events, as discussed below, have made Illinois Brick not much more than an
antitrust nuisance. Perhaps most importantly, and as Apple Inc.
v. Pepper demonstrates, although Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick
described the consequences of being a direct or an indirect purchaser, neither case established a bright-line test for determining
when one is a direct or an indirect purchaser.75
B.Associated General Contractors
Although Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick seemed straight
forward, the Court’s 1983 decision in Associated General Contractors

15 U.S.C § 15(a) (2019).
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 503 (1968).
70 Id. at 489–90.
71 It is worth noting that any coherent policy with respect to optimal levels
of antitrust enforcement advanced by Illinois Brick was ended with the passage of indirect purchaser statutes by states, which allow offensive use of the
pass-on theory. Thus, the level of exposure of a defendant may depend more on
geography than actual harm caused. The statutes were upheld by the Supreme
Court in California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 105–06 (1989).
72 Blair & Harrison, supra note 10, at 2.
73 Id. at 25.
74 Id.
75 See infra text accompanying notes 146–85.
68
69
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of California v. California State Council of Carpenters76 introduced
an element of vagueness. That case presented the Court with an
opportunity to clarify which parties were eligible to bring private
antitrust actions by weaving together the interests of deterrence,
avoidance of multiple liability, and avoidance of undue complication.77 It declined this opportunity and issued an opinion that
stands better than most cases for the adage that bad facts make
for bad law.
The complaint, simply put, was that various building contractors, who were members of a multi-employer bargaining association, had put pressure on other members and nonmembers to enter
into contracts with nonunion firms.78 Plaintiffs were unions that
claimed to be injured by virtue of what amounted to a group boycott.79
In what has become the Court’s most important antitrust
standing opinion, it held that the unions did not qualify under
section 4 of the Clayton Act as “any person” that has been injured
in their “business or property.”80 It was not that the union was not
a person; it was just not the right person.81 The Court interpreted
section 4, despite the “any person” language, as permitting only
certain parties to have standing.82 The Court started by noting
that the process of determining which parties were eligible to bring
antitrust actions was comparable to common law courts defining
proximate cause.83 It seems to suggest in this regard that the process involves weighing various factors. Thus, “the infinite variety
of claims that may arise make it virtually impossible to announce
a black-letter rule that will dictate the result in every case.”84
The Court then goes on to identify the factors to be consid85
ered. First, the party must have suffered the type of injury the
antitrust laws were designed to avoid.86 This was, of course, consistent with the Court’s decision in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo


See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 544–46 (1983).
77 Id. at 519–20.
78 Id. at 522–23.
79 Id. at 521–24.
80 Id. at 546.
81 Id. at 542.
82 Id. at 529, 535.
83 Id. at 535
84 Id. at 536.
85 Id. at 537.
86 Id. at 538.
76
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Bowl-O-Mat.87 Antitrust injury is a necessary condition in order
to have antitrust standing.88 The Court goes on to state “[a]n additional factor is the directness or indirectness of the asserted injury.”89 This, of course, folds Illinois Brick factors into standing
analysis.90 It is not clear, though, that the Court intended to say,
as it seemed to with respect to antitrust injury, that only direct
purchasers have standing. Instead, the Court restates the policies
underlying Illinois Brick: “[t]he existence of an identifiable class
of persons whose self-interest would normally motivate them to
vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement diminishes
the justification for allowing a more remote party ... to perform the
office of a private attorney general.”91 The language of the Court does
not sound as though one must be a direct purchaser to have standing,
although there is definitely a reference for that.92 Finally, echoing
Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick, the Court indicated that standing decisions should advance the policies of avoiding duplicative
recoveries and overly complicated antitrust trials especially with
respect to the issue of damages.93 Here again, though, the Court
seemed to hedge noting that there was a “strong interest ... in keeping
the scope of complex antitrust trials within judicially manageable
limits.”94 For reasons that are not clear, the Court envisioned a common fund that would have to be allocated among plaintiffs as opposed
to permitting each plaintiff to demonstrate its actual damages.95
The question arguably left open by Associated General Contractors was whether the Court had retreated somewhat from
what could be called a per se requirement that all plaintiffs must
have suffered both antitrust injury and to have suffered it directly.96
Further support from this position can be found in the Court’s
concluding comments:
Other relevant factors—the nature of the Union’s injury, the
tenuous and speculative character of the relationship between


428 U.S. 477, 487–88 (1977).
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 538.
89 Id. at 540.
90 Id. at 534–35.
91 Id. at 542 (emphasis added).
92 Id. at 542.
93 Id. at 543–44.
94 Id. at 543.
95 Id. at 544.
96 See generally id.
87
88

708 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:695
the alleged antitrust violation and the Union’s alleged injury,
the potential for duplicative recovery or complex apportionment of damages, and the existence of more direct victims of
the alleged conspiracy—weigh heavily against judicial enforcement of the Union’s antitrust claim.97

It is possible, even likely, that Associated General Contractors stands for the proposition that the directness of the antitrust
injury is but one factor to we weighed in determining antitrust
standing. If so, Associated General Contractors could legitimately
be viewed as implicitly limiting Illinois Brick. Certainly, this is
not the conventional interpretation and antitrust injury and direct
injury have both become necessary for antitrust standing.98 It is not
necessary, however, to read Associated General Contractors as firmly
establishing this outcome. In fact, read closely, it appears that some
indirect purchasers would qualify. For example, surely an indirect purchaser who pays a higher price because it buys from a
seller who has paid a higher price due to price fixing has suffered
the type of injury the antitrust laws were designed to prevent. In
addition, the indirect purchaser may be the most likely to bring
an action especially if the direct purchaser desires to remain in
good standing with its price fixing supplier.99 The risk of multiple
liability and complications in determining damages only comes
into play if the plaintiff is permitted to recover some amount more
than actual harm or if a court clings to the mistaken notion that
all antitrust damages are manifested as an overcharge.100
C.Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc.
Whatever door was left open by Associated General Contractors to allow courts to treat directness of harm as a factor in determining standing was closed in 1990 by the Court’s 5–4 decision
in Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc.101 The very strong position
adopted by the smallest possible majority of the Court concerned
the standing of ratepayers to whom the cost of natural gas was
passed on to by a regulated utility.102 The Court correctly viewed

Id. at 545–46 (emphasis added).
See generally id.
99 See infra text accompanying notes 295–307.
100 Id.
101 See generally Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990).
102 See id. at 204.
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the ratepayers as indirect purchasers and, thus, the issue was
framed as whether there should be an exception to Illinois
Brick.103 The framing of the question is critical. The Court could
have said that after Associated General Contractors, directness of
injury was but a factor in determining standing. Instead it returned (if it had ever deviated) to the view that directness is a
necessary condition of standing.104 The ratepayers argued that the
complexities avoided by Illinois Brick did not apply when the full
overcharge was automatically passed on to them.105
According to the Court there were three problems with this
position.106 First, the implication of the ratepayers’ argument was
that the utility itself was not injured.107 The Court reasoned that
this was impossible to know.108 For example, the market may have
been ripe for a price increase that would have benefitted the utility.109
This opportunity may have been removed when the utility was forced
to raise prices due to the cost increase.110 Second, there could be
delays in the passing on process that caused damage to the utility.111
Third, the Court indicated that the nature of rate regulation made
it unnecessary it compensate ratepayers112 because any recovery
by the direct purchaser would likely be passed on to ratepayers,
thereby off setting any overcharge. The Court also responded to the
argument that a utility, if permitted to pass on the overcharge,
would not have the incentive to sue its suppliers.113 It noted that
historically utilities had brought actions under the antitrust laws.114
In addition, it was possible utilities that did not sue suppliers would
not be permitted to shift avoidable overcharges to consumers.115
Ultimately the Court left little room to expand on the possibility of a more nuanced standing analysis as hinted at in Associated

Id. at 200.
Id. at 208.
105 Id.
106 See generally id. at 208–12.
107 See id. at 209.
108 See id. at 210.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 212.
113 Id. at 214.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 215–16.
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General Contractors. Although it conceded that “the rationales
underlying Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick will not apply with
equal force in all cases,”116 it went on to say “[t]he possibility of
allowing an exception, even in a rather meritorious case, would
undermine the rule.”117
II.THE PROBLEMS WITH ILLINOIS BRICK IN THE POST-SYLVANIA ERA
A.The Not-So-Simple Application of Illinois Brick and the
Implications of Apple Inc. v. Pepper
Although it seems like Illinois Brick along with UtiliCorp
establish a bright-line test, that is not the case. We know what the
consequences are when a potential plaintiff is viewed as indirect.
What those cases do not tell us, as Apple Inc. v. Pepper demonstrates,
is that classifying a party as direct or indirect is not necessarily an
easy matter. The indeterminacy has become more important lately
as distribution chains, with the advent of the internet, take forms
the Court could hardly have imagined 40 years ago. Still the problem
is not a new one.
1.Pre–Apple Inc. Cases
An early case illustrating this problem is Mid-West Paper
Products Co. v. Continental Group. Inc., in which plaintiffs purchased from competitors of the defendant which engaged in price
fixing. 118 The allegation was that plaintiffs paid higher prices because their supplier was able to raise prices in light of the higher
prices fixed by other sellers.119 Plaintiffs were direct purchasers
but not from those engaged in price fixing.120 Nevertheless, their
harm, in terms of paying supercompetitive prices was arguably a
direct result of the price fixing.121 The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit applied Illinois Brick in holding that plaintiffs did
not have standing.122 The court primarily replied on the difficulty

Id. at 216.
Id.
118 Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Cont’l Grp., 596 F.2d 573, 575 (3d Cir. 1979).
119 See id. at 575.
120 See id. at 575–76.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 584.
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of determining damages when it was unclear how much of the
price charged was a result of price fixing and how much was traceable to other variables.123 In particular the court noted that even
though the plaintiff did not purchase through an intermediary, the
actual damages were “indirect” and, therefore, analogous to those
suffered by indirect purchasers.124
A similar issue arose in In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litigation in which railroads serving the steel industry were
alleged to have blocked the entry of lower cost means of transporting
iron ore. 125 The issue was whether steel companies had standing under the theory that they had to pay more to non-conspiring companies.126 This time, the same court that had decided Mid-West Paper
determined that plaintiffs did have standing because the impact
was “directly traceable”127 to the actions of the defendants. According
to the court, current law does not support the conclusion that “indirect purchaser status is the death knell of plaintiff’s claim.”128 It
reasoned that the possibility of duplicate recovery, as cautioned
against by Illinois Brick, could be addressed at the proof of damages stage of the proceedings.129 The court seemed to redefine “direct
purchaser” to mean “a purchaser directly affected.”130
The difficulty of applying Illinois Brick is further illustrated
by Delaware Valley Surgical Supply Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, a
more recent decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.131 The
plaintiff, a hospital, in the action purchased supplies indirectly from
Johnson & Johnson.132 The price it paid, however, was determined
by negotiation between a group-buying organization of which it
was a member and Johnson & Johnson.133 The actual purchase was
made through a distributor but at the price agreed upon by the

Id. at 585.
See id. at 585–86.
125 See In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.3d 1144, 1151
(3d Cir. 1993).
126 Id.
127 Id. at 1167.
128 Id. at 1168.
129 Id. at 1169.
130 See id. at 1168.
131 Delaware Valley Surgical Supply Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 523 F.3d
1116, 1117 (9th Cir. 2008).
132 Id. at 1118.
133 See id. at 1118–19.
123
124

712 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:695
group-buying organization and the plaintiff.134 This effectively reduced the middleman to a conduit. Nevertheless, the court, placing
form over substance, held that a correct application of Illinois Brick
meant the plaintiff lacked standing.135
Maybe the most confusing and well-known case demonstrating the difficulty of applying Illinois Brick is the 1998 opinion of
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Campos v. Ticketmaster.136
Plaintiffs were purchasers of a concert ticket from Ticketmaster.137
Ticketmaster had contracts with most concert venues that allowed
Ticketmaster to distribute tickets for events held at those venues.138
Plaintiffs claimed that Ticketmaster had unlawfully raised the
prices of distributing tickets and that they—concertgoers—were
direct purchasers of those services.139 Here the Eight Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the concertgoers were indirect purchasers and,
thus, lacked standing under Illinois Brick.140 The court viewed
the venues as the direct purchasers of distribution services and the
concertgoers as indirect purchasers.141 In effect, distribution services were first purchased by venues and then the cost passed on to
concertgoers.142 According to the court, concertgoers were like
homeowners who hired a painter to paint their houses.143 The
painter then purchased the paint and the homeowners were then
indirect purchasers of the paint.144 The form over substance character of this rigid application of Illinois Brick can be understood
by noting that the scenario changes if the painter simply tells the
homeowner how much paint is needed and the homeowner purchases it. In between is the possibility that the painter itemizes
expenses as either cost of paint or cost of labor. In all scenarios,

Id.
Id. at 1123–24. More recently, the Ninth Circuit sought to distinguish
Delaware Surgical Supply in In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 313,
323–24 (9th Cir. 2017). That decision lead to Apple Inc. v. Pepper.
136 Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1168 (8th Cir. 1998).
137 Id. at 1166.
138 Id. at 1168.
139 Id. at 1171.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 1174.
143 Id. at 1170.
144 Id.
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the substance is the same yet, since 1977, antitrust enforcement has
depended on these non-substantive distinctions.145
2.Apple Inc. v. Pepper
The inability of Illinois Brick to deal with increasingly commonplace scenarios is best exemplified by Apple v. Pepper and, in
particular, the way it divided the Supreme Court. Notably, after
forty years of courts applying Illinois Brick the Supreme Court
split on its basic holding.146 Plaintiffs were purchasers of smartphone
apps who claimed that Apple had monopolized the iPhone app
market.147 Apple defended by claiming the plaintiffs were indirect
purchasers.148 Factually, Apple sells apps from its App Store. Some
apps are developed by Apple and other are developed by third parties.149 When one of the third-party apps is sold, Apple receives a
30 percent commission and the remainder goes to the developer.150
Developers are not permitted to sell apps through any other methods
of distribution.151 Perhaps most important is the fact that Apple
does not set the price of the apps.152 Those are set by the app suppliers with the only restriction being that the price end in $0.99.153
Before the Supreme Court, Apple’s argument was that it sold distribution services to app producers and was, if anything, an indirect seller to consumers, was accepted by the trial court,154 which
found that plaintiffs lacked standing under Illinois Brick. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.155
Apple was clearly a direct seller to consumers from a formalistic standpoint.156 The real issue before the Court was whether
Illinois Brick should be applied strictly or extended to protect a


Id.
The Court was divided five to four. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514,
1515 (2019).
147 Id. at 1518.
148 Id. at 1519.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-06714-YGR, 2013 WL
6253147, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2013).
155 In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 313, 323–24 (9th Cir. 2017).
156 Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1519.
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direct seller if that seller did not actually set prices but simply
received a commission.157 Ordinarily one would think that the pricesetting seller has whatever power there is to raise prices above
competitive levels and would, thus, be the ultimate target of an
antitrust action. That would mean, however, that consumers were
one step away from the level at which prices were set and would
not be classified as direct purchasers. This is, however, an overly
simplistic view of the determinants of price. Apple did not set the
price but it did set the 30 percent fee and whatever monopoly
overcharge was suffered by the customers was likely in part the
result of this 30 percent.158 In short, if Illinois Brick were literally
applied, then consumers were direct purchasers.159 If it were expanded to say that purchasers must buy directly from the price
setting parties (in this case the app developers), then consumers
were indirect purchasers.160
The Court was divided five–four.161 The majority stuck to a
strict application of Illinois Brick.162 Apple was ruled to be a direct
seller.163 Two aspects of the opinion are especially noteworthy.
First the majority noted that any other outcome would mean that
a monopoly retailer could avoid liability by allowing a manufacturer to set price and then just retain part of the proceeds from the
sale.164 Far more important in terms of the continued viability of
Illinois Brick, the Court addressed each of the rationales for that
opinion and concluded that they did not apply here.165 It did this in
a manner that could be interpreted as questioning whether any of
the rationales for Illinois Brick itself continued to be compelling.166
The first rationale, at least according to the majority, was that
antitrust law would be more effectively enforced by concentrating
the ability to pursue an action in direct purchasers.167 According
to the majority this was not applicable in this case.168 Thus:

Id. at 1522–23.
Id. at 1523.
159 Id. at 1519.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 1518.
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163 Id. at 1525.
164 Id. at 1522.
165 Id. at 1525.
166 Id. at 1524.
167 Id. at 1522.
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Leaving consumers at the mercy of monopolistic retailers simply
because upstream suppliers could also sue the retailers makes
little sense and would directly contradict the longstanding goal
of effective private enforcement and consumer protection in antitrust cases.169

Second, Illinois Brick was based on the difficulty of determining damages.170 For example in the case at hand, if Apple
were found liable the question would be how much lower in price
apps would have been if it were found that the 30 percent charge
was a product of monopolizing conduct. Here the majority noted
that damages calculations are difficult in a great many antitrust
cases and that Illinois Brick was not a “get-out-of-jail-free card
for monopolistic retailers to play any time that a damages calculation might be complicated.”171 Third, the majority considered
the rationale of Illinois Brick based on the difficulty of having to
apportion a common fund of damages among direct and indirect
purchasers.172 The majority simply noted in the case at hand
there was only one group of potential plaintiffs.173
When the dissenting opinion is considered along with the
majority opinion, what Apple Inc. illustrates is the unworkability of
Illinois Brick. In a very sharply worded opinion written by Justice
Gorsuch, the dissent viewed the issue in Apple Inc. as involving
“exactly the kind of ‘pass-on theory’ Illinois Brick rejected.”174 Specifically, the minority reasoned, the 30 percent charge was something
app suppliers were required to pay—like a cost of production.175
Those suppliers then determined the price to charge for the apps.176
In other words, whatever Apple may have done in violation of the
antitrust laws had its initial impact on app developers who then
passed-on that overcharge to consumers.177

Id. at 1524.
Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 1524–25.
173 Id. at 1525. The Court did note that there may be multiple plaintiffs but
that was normal in a great many cases. Also, it noted that Apple might be sued
for monopolization by buyers and for monopolization by suppliers of apps. In
this case, the damage theories would differ. Id.
174 Id. at 1528 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
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The dissent went on to argue that all the policies that were
advanced by Illinois Brick came into play in the instant case.178
For example, a court would have to determine to what extent Apple’s
practices caused harm to the app developers and then of how
much of the overcharge was actually passed onto consumers.179 In
fact, there could be separate lawsuits by developers and consumers
each wanting a piece of the overcharge pie180 and a resulting risk
of duplicative recoveries.181
More important than these opposing views with respect to
the practical effects of ruling one way or another is the clear indication that the Court is fundamentally divided over what Illinois
Brick stands for. According to the dissent, the majority:
(re)characterizes Illinois Brick as a rule that anyone who purchases goods directly from an alleged antitrust violator can sue,
while anyone who doesn’t, can’t. Under this revisionist version
of Illinois Brick, the dispositive question becomes whether an
“intermediary in the distribution chain” stands between the
plaintiff and the defendant. And because the plaintiff app purchasers in this case happen to have purchased apps directly
from Apple, the Court reasons, they may sue.182

The dissent’s view was that Illinois Brick did not require a
formalistic assessment of who were direct as opposed to indirect
purchasers.183 Instead the underlying rationale for Illinois Brick
was one of proximate cause.184 Thus, according to the dissent,
“[i]nstead of focusing on the traditional proximate cause question
where the overcharge is first (and thus surely felt) the Court’s test
turns on who happens to be in privity of contract with whom.”185
In short, to the majority Illinois Brick provided a bright-line
test of who was eligible to bring an antitrust action.186 To the dissent,
Illinois Brick stood for a proximate cause analysis and, under the

Id. at 1528–30.
Id. at 1528.
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fact pattern in that case, it just so happened that direct purchasers
were not within the scope of proximate causation.187
Ironically, both the majority and the dissent seem to undercut Illinois Brick itself. The majority downplays the policies
that were supposedly advanced by Illinois Brick arguing that they
simply do not apply in Apple Inc. v. Pepper.188 In fact, it notes that
all antitrust cases involve difficulties in determining damages.189
As a general matter, it comes very close to opining that the dangers Illinois Brick was designed to avoid were overstated. On the
other hand, under the dissent’s “proximate cause” analysis one
wonders what purpose Illinois Brick serves. Taken to its logical end,
the indirect purchaser element of determining antitrust standing
should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
B.Liability Under the Rule of Reason
As noted at the outset, Illinois Brick reflects a policy of limited liability.190 That may have made sense in the context of 1960s
and 1970s antitrust law. In that period a great number of practices were per se unlawful that are now assessed under the rule
of reason.191 This raised the risk of false positives—finding that
pro-competitive or harmless practices were unlawful.192 This has
changed and there are few per se rules left.193 In addition, the per
se rules that still exist have been softened.194 More importantly,
empirical evidence is now available that demonstrates that, under current law, plaintiffs rarely prevail.195
As indicated in the Introduction, the Sylvania case made the
most important change in antitrust by ruling that vertical restraints
on distribution would be assessed under the rule of reason.196


Id. at 1526.
Id. at 1524.
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190 See supra text accompanying note 19.
191 See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). See
generally THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 253–54 (2d ed.
2006); SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 36, at 223–24. A good summary of
developments is found in State Oil v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
192 Carrier, The Rule of Reason, supra note 18, at 828.
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194 See infra text accompanying notes 214–29.
195 See infra text accompanying notes 229–47.
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More importantly, the Court introduced the notion that restraints
on intrabrand competition might be a necessary part of a plan to
increase interbrand competition.197 It also noted the free rider problems faced by manufacturers who wanted resellers to be more aggressive in sales efforts.198
Changing the status of restraints on distribution left intact
vertical maximum and vertical minimum price fixing.199 These
too, however, were eventually placed in the rule of reason category.200
In State Oil v. Kahn,201 the Court overturned Albrecht v. Herald
Co.,202 a 1967 case that held that vertical maximum resale price
fixing was per se unlawful. The Albrecht Court reasoned that maximum prices could impede efforts by dealers to promote their products by offering services.203 Kahn, however, noted that the per se
status of vertical maximum price fixing would encourage vertical
integration.204 Moreover, it was unlikely that manufacturers would
set prices so low that their resellers’ efforts would be impeded.205
It was not until 2007, in Leegin Creative Leather Products v.
PKS, Inc.,206 that the nearly 100-year-old per se prohibition on setting minimum resale prices was overturned. Although there was
a substantial delay of 30 years since Sylvania, the decision in Leegin
was largely a result of that case.207 In effect, manufacturers may
find it advantageous in interbrand markets to restrict intrabrand
competition based on price.208 Specifically, manufacturers finding
that non-price competition was advantageous were faced with the
free rider problem.209 Resellers offering more services to customers
might find they were undercut by discounters who did not offer
comparable services.210

Id. at 54–55.
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In the case of two other vertical restraints—exclusive dealand tying212—the shift in approach has been slightly less
pronounced but it is nevertheless clear that the burden on plaintiffs is higher than prior to Sylvania. In the case of exclusive dealing
it was once felt that the actual impact on competition need not be
shown as long as a substantial share of a market was foreclosed
to competitors.213 Now the approach has shifted to something
closer to if not exactly like a rule of reason analysis.214 Specifically,
courts have recognized the importance of exclusive dealing as a
means of promoting interbrand competition.215 In effect, resellers
who must only sell one brand will make maximum efforts to promote sales of that brand and will be limited in their ability to free
ride on the efforts of the manufacturer.216
The analysis of tying arrangements has undergone a similar evolution.217 Early cases can fairly be said to have found that
tying was per se unlawful218 as long as two products were involved
and the defendant possessed power in the tying product and effected
a substantial dollar amount of commerce in the tied product market.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet officially taken tying out
of the per se category, it has added the requirement that the buyer
actually be forced to purchase the tying product.219 In addition,
the Court and lower courts seem more willing to question whether
there are economic reasons regarding the “products” involved as
a single product220 and to consider pro-competitive justifications.221
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Under an exclusive dealing arrangement, a reseller may only deal in the
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The movement toward defendant-favoring standards of analysis has likewise extended to horizontal restraints where per se
rules have been softened.222 The clearest sign of this shift came in
two cases.223 In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States, the Supreme Court seemed to relax the per se rule as it applied to price fixing in instances involving professional standards.224
More importantly, in Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,225 the Court noted that the per se rule against price
fixing was not to be applied literally but depended on whether the
practice was designed to “increase economic efficiency and render
markets more, rather than less, competitive.”226 In effect, the label
“per se price fixing” was not to be applied until a harm/benefit
analysis took place.227
Similarly, after a period during which group boycotts were
felt to be per se unlawful,228 the Court seemed to revise its thinking. In Northwest Stationers v. Pacific Stationary and Printing
Co.,229 the Court said that the per se label had been reserved for
instances in which the boycotting firms possess market power, denied the boycotted firm access to suppliers or customers, and were
not consistent with enhancing overall efficiency.230 As with Broadcast
Music, the announced approach necessitated a measuring of harms
and benefits before applying the per se label.231
This major shift away from per se rules means that, except
in very few instances, cases are now assessed under the rule of
reason.232 It is not an exaggeration to say that the rule of reason
means that defendants prevail in the vast majority of cases.233
This means that the multiple liability danger that was at the heart
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224 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs’, 435 U.S. at 679.
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of Illinois Brick is no longer a threat (if it ever was).234 Two empirical studies by Michael Carrier illustrate just how much the
odds are against plaintiffs under the rule of reason.235 First, it is
useful to recall the progression in a rule of reason case. Initially
the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that the defendant’s
action was anticompetitive.236 Typically this means defining the
market and assessing the action’s impact in the market.237 The
burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the practice had pro-competitive impact.238 At that point, the plaintiff may
attempt to show that there are less restrictive methods of achieving the pro-competitive effects.239 After that, the actual pro and
anticompetitive effects are weighed.240
Carrier examined all rule of reason cases in the period from
1977 (the year of Sylvania) to 1999.241 There were 495 cases.242 Of
these, 84 percent did not make it past the first step.243 In other
words, 84 percent of the time plaintiffs lost even before any balancing of pro- and anticompetitive effects took place.244 In fact,
the balancing step was only reached in 4 percent of cases with the
vast majority having been dismissed in the defendant’s favor.245
Carrier updated his study in 2009, this time with a sample of 222
rule of reason cases.246 The results were even more pronounced. This
time, nearly 97 percent of rule of reason cases were dismissed at
the first stage of the analysis.247 In fact, only five cases made it to the
balancing stage.248 The salient point is that since there is rarely
liability under the rule of reason, the fears of complicated processes
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of apportioning damages and multiple liability as expressed by the
Illinois Brick Court simply do not exist. Moreover, a policy, as evidenced by Illinois Brick, of limited exposure of defendants to indirect
purchasers for fear of generating false positives is unsupportable.
C.Procedural and Evidentiary Changes Since Illinois Brick
The policies underpinning Illinois Brick have also become
moot because of changes in the law since 1977 dealing with pleading
standards, expert testimony, and class certification. The critical case
with respect to the first of these is Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,249
a 2007 Supreme Court decision. That decision raised the bar for antitrust plaintiffs by changing what was necessary to avoid a motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.250 Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires that the defendants
entered into an actual agreement.251 In Twombly, plaintiffs sought
to meet the pleading requirements by stating that the defendants
had engaged in parallel conduct.252 From this, the inference to be
drawn was that they had agreed on their anticompetitive actions.253
Under prior law, a complaint was not to be dismissed unless “it
appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff [could] prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”254
Although parallel conduct is certainly consistent with the
existence of an agreement, as the Twombly Court noted,255 it is
also consistent with the absence of an agreement. Accordingly,
parallel conduct is “just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted
by common perceptions of the market.”256 Based on this, it agreed
with the trial court that the complaint should be dismissed.257 In
so doing, it announced a new and higher pleading standard.258
That standard was a requirement of fact that made the existence

550 U.S. 544 (2007).
Id. at 570.
251 Id. at 545.
252 Id. at 544.
253 Id. at 548.
254 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).
255 550 U.S. at 553.
256 Id. at 554.
257 Id. at 549.
258 Id. at 569.
249
250

2020]

WHAT NOW ILLINOIS BRICK

723

of a conspiracy “plausible”259 not merely possible under some sets
of circumstances.
There can be little doubt that Twombly was intended to
raise the bar for plaintiffs.260 It increases the burden at the pleading
stage and requires the assertion of facts that may not be known
until after discovery.261 Just how high the bar has been raised is the
subject of disagreement.262 Moreover, raising the bar does not necessarily mean increasing the rate of dismissals.263 In fact, a comprehensive 2017 study of the impact of Twombly on cases generally
indicates that the dismissal rates before and after Twombly are
basically the same.264 This may reflect the failure of lower courts
to interpret Twombly as requiring a change from prior pleading
practices.265 It also may simply note an adjustment in actual
pleadings in order to avoid the implications of Twombly.266 Whatever the adjustment, the fact that it must be made at all inures
to the benefit of antitrust defendants.267
A change with respect to admissible evidence in the post–
Illinois Brick era has also likely affected the prospects for private
antitrust plaintiffs. Recall that the Illinois Brick Court feared being enmeshed in a complicated process of apportioning a fixed
overcharge amount among plaintiffs in the chain of distribution
and the threat of multiple liability.268 Whatever the validity of the
Court’s rationale in 1977, it is questionable by virtue of its 1993
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decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.269 In that
case the Court ratcheted up the requirement for the introduction
of expert testimony, a great deal of which is about the subject of
damages.270 Under the so-called Frye271 standard, expert testimony,
to be admissible, had to be generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.272 Daubert established additional factors for
the introduction of expert testimony, including whether the methodology “can be (and has been) tested,”273 whether it has been subjected to “peer review and publication,”274 “the known or potential
rate of error,”275 and acceptance in a specifically recognized scientific community.276 All of these requirements are in service to Federal
Rule of Evidence 702, which allows admissibility when the evidence “will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue.”277
The implications of Daubert on Illinois Brick may not be
immediately obvious. It is important, though, to recall that Illinois
Brick excludes parties who are admittedly harmed by those violating the antitrust law because recognition of their right to bring
an action would render matters too complicated.278 If it is to have
any substantive import, the Court must mean that outcomes with
respect to harm would be unreliable because of the complexity of
determining damages. Obviously, the reasoning has a tail-waggingthe-dog element: because determination of the appropriate remedy
is difficult, the plaintiff is denied the opportunity to demonstrate
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liability. Nevertheless, after Daubert, the problem of complexity
and uncertainty can be dealt with at the point of the admissibility
of evidence. If a judge determines the submission is not helpful to
the trier of fact, it can be excluded. Plaintiffs with difficult to prove
damages may choose to forgo bringing an action. On the other hand,
with modern econometric methods, the complications of 1977 may
be far less troublesome today.279
Changes that undermine the need for Illinois Brick can
also be traced to modifications in certifying classes in antitrust
action. The drift in this respect has been in the direction of requiring those attempting to certify a class to bear the burden of proof
on the merits of the underlying theory of liability.280 The harm to
be avoided, arguably, is that the easy certification of a class may
result in settlement of relatively meritless suits.281 Although not an
antitrust case, the most important decision in this regard is WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.282 The principal issue in Wal-Mart was
whether a group wishing to be certified as a class satisfied the
commonality requirement under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
23(a)(2) and predominance under Rule 23(b)(3).283
The case involved accusations of gender discrimination
against Wal-Mart.284 According to the court, in order to satisfy
class certification requirements, it was not enough to simply allege
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that Wal-Mart engaged in discriminatory conduct.285 Instead, it
was necessary to present “significant proof” that Wal-Mart “operated
under a general policy of discrimination.”286 In effect, the merits of
the case became intertwined with the issue of class certification.
According to one commentator who has followed class certification requirements in the context of antitrust cases, the 2011
decision in Wal-Mart Stores was “anticlimactic.”287 The merging
of issues of commonality and predominance for class certification
purposes with the merits of the case had already occurred in antitrust.288 In the context of this analysis, this represents an additional barrier to plaintiffs and another reason that Illinois Brick’s
protection of defendants is unwarranted. For example, in In re New
Motor Vehicle Canadian Export Antitrust Litigation,289 a suit brought
by buyers and lessees of automobiles, the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit noted, with respect to class certification, that “[i]ntertwined with the scope of our review on appeal is the question
of how far a district court should go in testing legal and factual
premises at the certification stage. When such premises are disputed, the court may ‘probe beneath the pleadings.’”290 In reversing the lower court’s decision to certify the class, the appellate
court required “a more thorough explanation of how the pivotal
evidence behind plaintiff’s theory can be established. If there is
no realistic means of proof, many resources will be wasted setting
up a trial the plaintiffs cannot win.”291
Similar in tone is Blades v. Monsanto,292 in which the proposed class was composed of farmers who purchased corn and soybean seeds at prices that were allegedly the result of price fixing.
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Here, the court announced the premise for its analysis: “[t]he preliminary inquiry at the class certification stage may require the
court to resolve disputes going to the factual setting of the case,
and such disputes may overlap the merits of the case.”293 The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit then went on to affirm the
lower court’s denial of certification.294 Specifically, it rejected the
expert testimony for the plaintiffs because it did not consider
“whether the markets or the alleged conspiracy at issue here actually operated in such a manner as to justify [the] presumption”295
that impact can be determined on a class-wide basis.
The overall point is that whatever fears may have existed
in 1977 about multiple liability and complexity seem far less justified today, if they are even justified at all. New pleading standards have raised the burden of successful litigation to plaintiffs.296
After Daubert, complexity may still exist, but a court is free to
exclude testimony that is not sound and unlikely to help the trying of fact.297 Finally, the danger that liberal class certification
will lead to meritless claims by classes of plaintiffs has surely declined after Twombly and the merger of class certification issues
with issues of liability.
D.Questions of Motivation
A critical element of Illinois Brick is the Court’s decision to
choose deterrent over-compensation as the primary goal of antitrust damages. The problem is that there is little or no reason to
believe that, as an empirical matter, direct purchasers have been
more aggressive private enforcers of the antitrust laws than indirect purchasers. First, many direct purchasers may fear offending
suppliers on which they depend. Second, it is possible that firms
that are able to pass on most or all of an overcharge are simply
not motivated to pursue an award that may be perceived as a
windfall.
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On the issue of the aggressiveness of direct purchasers, one
excellent example is the case of Campos v. Ticketmaster, discussed
earlier.298 There, it will be recalled, purchasers of tickets through
Ticketmaster were classified as indirect purchasers of tickets.299
The direct purchasers of Ticketmaster’s services supposedly were
the venues at which concerts were held.300 The problem is those socalled direct purchasers had no motivation to sue Ticketmaster.
They were involved in a transaction with Ticketmaster but, as
Joseph Bauer has observed, “this was clearly not a situation
where Ticketmaster had created a product and then sold it at an
elevated price to its ‘direct purchaser,’ which in turn sold it to the
indirect purchaser plaintiffs.”301 In fact, the question becomes on
what basis the venues would have recovered. They did not purchase tickets, nor did they pay for ticket distribution services.302
There are other instances which create doubt about the Court’s
belief that purchasers would be the most motivated to bring actions.303 According to an American Antitrust Institute Working
Paper, “[i]n the Microsoft class action litigation, no significant direct purchaser class was ever certified, leaving the vast majority
of direct purchasers uncompensated.”304 In fact, it was estimated
that of possibly billions of dollars of damages, only $10.5 million
were ever recovered.305
There are good reasons for direct purchasers to not pursue
actions against their suppliers. The most obvious one is that the
supplier or suppliers may possess market or monopoly power. If
the supplier or suppliers are the primary or only sources of needed
inputs, a lawsuit may mean the end of what was a critical relationship. Another theory, forwarded by Barak Richman and
Christopher Murray, is that price fixing suppliers may actually
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share the benefits of their activities with direct purchasers.306 The
authors base their theory on the idea that “an upstream cartel can
prevent private litigation as long as it assures that its direct purchasers downstream benefit more from the existence of the cartel
than they can claim antitrust damages for.”307
There are no doubt cases in which direct purchasers do not
fear retaliation by the price fixing cartel and are not actually
made better off by virtue of sharing in the profits garnered by the
price fixers. Even in this so-called “clean” case, can we be certain
that direct purchasers will aggressively pursue legal action? In cases
that they cannot pass on the overcharge, it would seem likely but
with possible exceptions. In cases that the overcharge can easily
be passed-on, the probabilities likely drop. This may seem counterintuitive. In both cases—no or little pass-on or full pass-on—it
appears to be in the profit maximizing interest of the firm to pursue
the maximum expected recovery possible. This raises two related
questions. First, do firms take advantage of every profit maximizing opportunity? Second, are firms that pass on most or all of the
overcharge rather easily likely to feel as “damaged” or as “wronged”
as firms that are unable to pass on the overcharge?
Both of these questions seem awkward because they raise
issues of how firms behave and or what might be called the “psychology” of business decisions. Whether firms seek solely to maximize profits has been a long-standing area of debate.308 In theory,
a corporation that is under performing is ripe for a takeover by
those who see the potential for increased profit. This obviously
raises principal-agent issues—just how much do the utility functions of those who manage firms deviate from the goals of shareholders? Even if one thinks the deviation between the goals of
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management and shareholders is rare and narrow, that does not
solve the problem.
Although impossible to verify as an empirical matter, there
is no doubt that many direct purchasers are not corporations.
When management and ownership merge, the preference of management for lower stress, leisure time, and an aversion to confrontation may result in avoiding legal action, even when the expected
monetary value is positive. Although it is conjecture, behavior
may change, especially for the manager/owner when overcharges
are easily passed-on. When they are not passed-on the result is a
decrease in profit. When they are passed-on, profits remain the
same and there may be little incentive to litigate over what may
be perceived as a windfall.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Antitrust policy is largely shaped by the desire to balance the
problems of false positives and false negatives. False positives occur when a harmless or pro-competitive activity is found to violate
the antitrust laws.309 False negatives are obviously the opposite.310
The problem is particularly severe in antitrust because most activities are assessed under the rule of reason, which is by no means a
bright-line test.311 The continued application of Illinois Brick is
best assessed in terms of whether it increases the likelihood of
errors of either type.
The possibility that loosening the reins of Illinois Brick in
the current era of antitrust would result in greater error rates is
exceedingly slim. This Article explains why. Antitrust law has
changed dramatically since 1977.312 The substantive law has shifted
to be highly protective of defendants.313 Success for a plaintiff in
a rule of reason case is rare.314 Procedural changes relating to
pleading and class certification have also raised barriers to plaintiffs.315 Standards have also been raised with respect to expert
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testimony that make it unlikely that any but the most well developed damages theories will be admitted into evidence.316 Finally,
Apple v. Pepper reveals a sharp division in the Court on the issue
of what Illinois Brick means.317 In sum, whatever role Illinois
Brick may have ever played in rationalizing antitrust law is now
unneeded, and the recent decision by the Court illustrates that,
after forty years, a consensus is lacking on what it stands for.318
The question then becomes what adjustments should be
made. This Article closes with three possibilities.
1. The first and least complicated is simply to overturn
Illinois Brick. Yes, this will invite more litigation by
indirect purchasers, but, given the documented reluctance of direct purchasers to pursue actions, this
may be necessary. The concern about multiple liability
noted by the Court in Illinois Brick is overstated.319
Each indirect purchaser should be limited to a recovery
equal to the amount by which it was actually damaged—not a portion of the overcharge. A corollary to
this is that direct purchasers would also be entitled to
the amount by which they were damaged. As noted earlier, the Court’s decision to adopt the overcharge measure of damages in price fixing cases but not in others
was not well-founded. Restricting plaintiffs to lost profits means that there is no danger of duplicative recoveries and that Hanover Shoe also becomes obsolete.
2. A second approach involves a slight reinterpretation
of Associated General Contractors. It will be recalled
that the Court weighs a variety of factors in its standing
analysis.320 One of those factors—direct purchasing—
has become a required factor.321 An approach that
would alleviate the harshness of Illinois Brick would
be to simply make directness of the injury one of the
factors to be weighed against the others. In short,
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directness would no longer be necessary in order for
an antitrust plaintiff to have standing. Interestingly
this is arguably consistent with a careful reading of
Associated General Contractors.322
3. The third approach would be the most difficult for
the Court to implement. It would provide an Illinois
Brick exemption for indirect purchasers in cases in
which substantial direct purchaser action has not
been brought within a specified period of time.323 For
example, if three years after the cause of action accrues, the direct purchasers had not filed an action,
the Illinois Brick “gate” would open for indirect purchasers. Realistically, it is difficult to imagine this
exemption as resulting from judicial action. It would
require the unlikely event of a case making it to the
Supreme Court in which such an exemption was applied by a lower court. If this proposal were adopted, it
seems more likely to be the result of legislative action.
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